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Abstract: A recent but widespread view holds that ethnic or cultural groups have their own 
distinctive epistemologies, that epistemologies are also gendered, and that these have been 
largely ignored by the dominant social group. A corollary of this view states that educational 
research is pursued within a framework that represents particular assumptions about 
knowledge and knowledge production that reflect the interests and historical traditions 
of this dominant group. The call for epistemological diversity becomes problematic when 
it conflates epistemological pluralism and epistemological relativism. More often than 
not, in such arguments for different, diverse, alternative, decolonized or demasculinized 
epistemologies some relevant philosophical issues remain unresolved, if not unaddressed 
altogether. What exactly do these claims about epistemological diversity mean? Do these 
ways of establishing knowledge stand up to critical interrogation? Moreover, how do they 
relate to traditional epistemological distinctions, e.g. between knowledge and belief and 
between descriptive and normative inquiry, and to epistemologically essential components 
like warrant/justification and truth? This paper examines some of the mistakes and mis-
conceptions involved in appeals to diverse epistemologies. The concern is not just whether 
or not a word (‘epistemology’) is being misused, but also (and importantly) whether or not 
the issues dealt with in epistemology (a complex field that has evolved over a long period 
of time) are being given short shrift, if not ignored altogether.
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‘Epistemological diversity’
My concern in this article is to demonstrate that so-called ‘epistemological di-
versity’, an idea frequently employed in postcolonial and feminist theory (within 
 1 Artykuł ukaże się w przekładzie na język polski Anny Wróblewskiej-Kowalczyk pt. „Zróżnicowanie 
epistemologiczne” w edukacji. Rozważania filozoficzne i dydaktyczne. W: Uniwersalizm i region-
alizm pedagogiki filozoficznej, Sztobryn S., Stępkowski D. (red.). Wydawnictwo Naukowe PTF 
„Chowanna” (w druku).
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educational discourse and elsewhere), refers neither to a multitude of truths nor 
to an ‘anything goes’ conception of justification, but rather to different experiences 
connected to particular social locations. In this sense, reference to ‘epistemologies’ 
– and reference to “plural systems of knowledges” (De Sousa Santos et al. 2008, p. 
xxxix) or to indigenous, local or subaltern ways of knowing – is not only unhelp-
ful but also misleading.
The ideas of epistemological diversity and diverse epistemologies have a rich 
recent history. In Aaron Pallas’s discussion of the ways and possibilities of preparing 
doctoral students for ‘epistemological diversity’, he writes, “One of the most confus-
ing developments in educational research over the past quarter-century has been 
the proliferation of epistemologies – beliefs about what counts as knowledge in the 
field of education, what is evidence of a claim, and what counts as warrant for that 
evidence” (Pallas 2001, p. 6). According to Pallas, novice researchers and seasoned 
academics alike are experiencing difficulties in keeping up with the “cacophony 
of diverse epistemologies” (ibid.), like foundationalism, rationalism, naturalism, 
empiricism, positivism, postpositivism, antifoundationalism, pragmatism, relativ-
ism, feminist standpoint epistemology, postmodernism, constructivism, and the 
like. Pallas considers these ‘epistemologies’ to be fundamental to the production 
of, and engagement with educational research. “Since epistemologies undergird 
all phases of the research process, engaging with epistemology is integral to learn-
ing the craft of research”. Furthermore, “epistemologies shape scholars’ abilities 
to apprehend and appreciate the research of others”, and it this appreciation that 
is “a prerequisite for the scholarly conversations that signify a field’s collective 
learning” (ibid.). Pallas continues: “If educational researchers cannot understand 
and engage with one another, both within and across at least educational research 
communities, the enterprise is doomed to failure” (ibid., p. 7). Therefore, in order 
to avoid an ongoing pattern of epistemological narrow-mindedness and single-
mindedness, Pallas emphasizes the need on the part of educational researchers 
“to engage with multiple epistemological perspectives to the point that members 
of different educational research practice can understand one another, despite, 
or perhaps through their differences”. Pallas considers the preparation of “novice 
educational researchers for such epistemological diversity” to be “one of the most 
important things that faculties if research universities can do” (ibid.).
In their defence of what they call the “ecology of knowledges” Boaventura de 
Sousa Santos, João Arriscado Nunes and Maria Paula Meneses, too, speak of the 
immense “epistemological diversity of the world” (De Sousa Santos et al. 2008, pp. 
xix, xlviii). However, on the basis of the premise that “there is no global social justice 
without global cognitive justice” (ibid., p. xix), they relate this appeal not to different 
normative theories of knowledge, but rather to diversity across ethnicities, cultures, 
etc. (see also Green 2008, for a similar approach). They argue that although “there 
has been a growing recognition of the cultural diversity of the world” over the last 
few decades, “with current controversies focusing on the terms of such recognition 
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[…,] the same cannot be said of the recognition of the epistemological diversity of 
the world, that is, of the diversity of knowledge systems underlying the practices 
of different social groups across the globe” (De Sousa Santos et al. 2008, p. xix).
Beginning with the assumption that “cultural diversity and epistemological 
diversity are reciprocally embedded”, the authors’ intention is to show that “the 
reinvention of social emancipation is premised upon replacing the ‘monoculture 
of scientific knowledge’ by an ‘ecology of knowledges’”. In other words, “far from 
refusing science”, the “alternative epistemology” envisaged here “places the latter in 
the context of diversity of knowledges existing in contemporary societies” (ibid., p. 
xx). This “ecology of knowledges is an invitation to the promotion of non-relativistic 
dialogues among knowledges, granting ‘equality of opportunities’ to the different 
kinds of knowledge engaged in ever broader epistemological disputes aimed both 
at maximizing their respective contributions to build a more democratic and just 
society and at decolonizing knowledge and power” (ibid.).
This exemplifies the recent but widespread view that ethnic or cultural groups 
have their own distinctive epistemologies, that epistemologies are also gendered, 
and that these have been largely ignored by the dominant social group. A corollary 
of this view states that educational research is pursued within a framework that 
represents particular assumptions about knowledge and knowledge production that 
reflect the interests and historical traditions of this dominant group. For example, 
in opposition to “the monochrome logic of Western epistemology” (Odora Hoppers 
2002a, p. vii), Catherine Odora Hoppers draws attention to the existence of “plu-
ral manifestations of epistemology” and endorses indigenous knowledge systems 
and indigenous theories of knowledge (Odora Hoppers 2002b, p. 18). In her book 
Technofeminism Judy Wajcman (2004) makes a similar plea for ‘epistemological 
diversity’ and for the coexistence of a multitude of truths. Other popular, related 
terms include ‘democratic epistemology’ (Nkomo 2000, p. 54), ‘multicultural epis-
temologies’ (Banks 1998), ‘African’/‘Afrocentric epistemology’ (Asante 1990; 2005; 
Bakari 1997; Teffo 2000, p. 112), ‘feminist epistemology’ (Harding 1987; 1996; 2002; 
Code 2012; Schumann 2016), ‘Chicana feminist epistemology’ (Delgado Bernal 
1998), ‘Afrocentric feminist epistemology’ (Hill Collins 1990), etc. – alongside ref-
erences to ‘sexist’/‘androcentric’ and ‘racist epistemologies’ (Braidotti 1991; 1993; 
2006; Scheurich, Young 1997, respectively), as well as ‘ecology of knowledges’ (De 
Sousa Santos et al. 2008), ‘women’s’ or ‘gendered ways of knowing’ (Belenky et al. 
1986; Harding 1996), ‘Islamization of knowledge’ (Dangor 2005), and ‘African’ or 
‘native ways of knowing’ (Dei 2002; 2004; Barnhardt, Kawagley 2005, respectively).
For the remainder of this section, I will concentrate on the arguments advanced 
by De Sousa Santos et al (2008): “Conceptions of knowledge, of what it means 
to know, of what counts as knowledge, and how that knowledge is produced are 
as diverse as the [different] cosmologies and normative frameworks […]”. They 
assert that all “social practices involve knowledge” and that the “production of 
knowledge is, in itself, a social practice” (xxi). The authors consider “recognition 
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of the epistemological diversity of the world” to be “inseparable from the diversity 
of the cosmologies that divide and organize the world in ways that differ from 
Western cosmology and its offshoot, modern science” (ibid.). They contend that 
epistemological diversity is “neither the simple reflection or epiphenomenon of 
ontological diversity or heterogeneity nor a range of culturally specific ways of 
expressing a fundamentally unified world”. There exists “no essential or definitive 
way of describing, ordering, and classifying processes, entities, and relationships 
in the world”. In fact, “different modes of knowing, being irremediably partial and 
situated, will have different consequences and effects on the world”. The authors 
take the “very capacity of the modern sciences to create new entities and in this way 
to enact an ontological politics […] – with the effect, intentional or not, of increasing 
this heterogeneity of the world – […] to support this conception”. De Sousa Santos 
et al understand this to give  “shape to a robust realism and to a strong objectivity, 
a clear awareness of the need to accurately and precisely identify the conditions 
in which knowledge is produced and its assessment on the basis of its observed 
or expected consequences”. This, they contend, “allows a rigorous account of the 
situatedness, partiality, and constructedness of all knowledges, while rejecting 
relativism as an epistemological and moral stance” (ibid., p. xxxi).
It is not at all clear how an appeal to “the situatedness […] of all knowledges” 
can avoid the charge of relativism, how “partiality” is to be reconciled with “strong 
objectivity”, or “constructedness of all knowledges” with a “robust realism”. “That 
which exists – knowledge, technological objects, buildings, roads, cultural objects 
– exists because it is constructed through situated practices”, according to De Sousa 
Santos et al. They see the pertinent distinction to be “not between the real and the 
constructed, but between that which is well constructed, which successfully resists 
the situations in which its consistency, solidity, and robustness are put to the test, 
and that which is badly constructed, and hence vulnerable to criticism or erosion”. 
They take this to constitute “the difference that allows a distinction to be made 
between facts (well constructed) and artifacts (badly constructed)” (ibid.).
In her plea for an epistemically diverse undergraduate curriculum, Kathy 
Luckett, too, claims that students should be encouraged to “understand knowl-
edge as socially constructed, historically and culturally specific, and that their own 
judgements are contextually contingent” (Luckett 2001, p. 32). But what is the status 
of this particular knowledge claim? Is it also historically and culturally specific? 
Is Luckett’s judgement also contextually contingent? There is clearly a grain of 
truth in constructivism. Some facts are socially constructed, the results of human 
description and designation – like pass grades in tests or exams, codes of ethics, 
laws, speed limits, standards of etiquette, culinary recipes, etc.: contingent facts 
that emanate from our social practices. Constructivism errs, however, in saying 
that all facts, including historical and scientific facts, are human constructs. As 
a pedagogy, I suggest, constructivism has two major, related shortcomings. It 
degrades a fundamental educational task – that of transmission of knowledge. 
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Furthermore, like postmodernism, constructivism is not only misleading but 
also potentially dangerous, in that it gives people (educators as well as learners) 
a false sense of empowerment and authority. Contrary to what their advocates have 
contended, neither approach is emancipatory. In fact, both as a pedagogy and as 
a learning theory, constructivism is likely to be disturbingly disempowering. The 
failure of outcomes-based education in most parts of the world, with its devaluation 
of subject-based knowledge, knowledge developed in the past and of knowledge 
for its own sake, is testimony to the plausibility of this judgement2. But suppose 
we accept this constructivist framework: could we not then distinguish between 
knowledge (well constructed) and superstition (badly constructed), between sci-
ence (well constructed) and pseudo-science (badly constructed)?
More often than not, however, in such arguments for different, diverse, alterna-
tive, decolonized or demasculinized epistemologies some relevant philosophical 
issues remain unresolved, if not unaddressed altogether. What exactly do these 
claims about epistemological diversity mean? Do these ways of establishing knowl-
edge stand up to critical interrogation? Moreover, how do they relate to traditional 
epistemological distinctions, e.g. between knowledge and belief and between de-
scriptive and normative inquiry, and to epistemologically essential components 
like warrant/justification and truth?
Some essential distinctions
Jon Levisohn and Denis Phillips explain that, especially in the educational literature 
on multicultural reforms, the language of epistemology has been employed in some 
kind of rhetorical inflation, thus obscuring rather than clarifying important issues 
and distinctions (Levisohn, Phillips 2012, p. 40). Traditionally, ‘epistemology’ refers 
to ‘theory/logic of knowledge’ (episteme – knowledge; logos – word). Over the cen-
turies, beginning with Socrates and Plato, epistemologists have reached a general 
agreement about a basic division, that between knowledge and belief. The present 
concern is not just whether or not a word (‘epistemology’) is being misused, but also 
(and importantly) whether or not the issues dealt with in epistemology (a complex 
field that has evolved over a long period of time) is being given short shrift, if not 
ignored altogether. A related distinction has been made between descriptive and 
normative inquiry, regarding beliefs and knowledge. “If these distinctions are 
 2 This is not the place for a detailed critique of these approaches. My sketchy remarks here are 
unlikely to persuade anyone that constructivism, for example, should be rejected. They merely 
serve to underline my misgivings about bestowing special status in education on a theoretical 
orientation that is deeply problematic. As Heila Lotz-Sisitka claims, ‘education has a critical 
role to play in preparing children to live in the world’ (Lotz-Sisitka 2009, p. 71; emphasis added). 
This arguably requires that those who so prepare children live there, too. Frankly, I cannot see 
constructivism making a substantial contribution to this preparation process.
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blurred”, the authors write, “then all rational argument is potentially undermined, 
including the very arguments [advocates of epistemological diversity] employ” 
(ibid., p. 42). In order to establish some kind of conceptual clarity, Levisohn and 
Phillips set out the following distinct understandings:
1) epistemology as a normative field of inquiry,
2) an epistemology as a normative theory of knowledge,
3) an epistemology as a descriptive account of how people acquire beliefs, and
4) an epistemology as a description of a set of beliefs.
The first of these refers to the classical philosophical understanding of knowl-
edge. According to Socrates, in Plato’s Meno: “True opinions, as long as they stay, 
are splendid and do all the good in the world, but they will not stay long – off and 
away they run out of the soul of mankind, so they are not worth much until you 
fasten them up with the reasoning of cause and effect. [...] When they are fastened 
up, first they become knowledge, secondly they remain; and that is why knowledge 
is valued more than right opinion, and differs from right opinion by this bond” 
(Plato 1970, p. 65). And in Plato’s Theaetetus the (rhetorical) question is, “how can 
there ever be knowledge without an account and right belief?” (Plato 1978, p. 909). 
Relevant distinctions are made here between knowledge and belief, between mere 
belief and well-warranted (or adequately justified) belief, and between true belief 
and justified true belief. The inquiry here is essentially normative, for example, 
evaluating beliefs and belief strategies, investigating what beliefs are trustwor-
thy enough to be acted on, how researchers should validate their findings, what 
forms of argument and what kinds of justification are acceptable, who (if anyone) 
counts as an epistemic authority, etc. This is, incidentally, not an essentially or 
exclusively ‘Western’ philosophical understanding of knowledge. It should be 
noted, for example, that in Yoruba, too, pertinent distinctions are made between 
gbàgbó (belief; the subjective, private or personal component of knowledge) and 
mò (knowledge in the sense of ‘knowledge-that’). Barry Hallen and J.O. Sodipo 
observe that “gbàgbó that may be verified is gbàgbó that may become mò. Gbàgbó 
that is not open to verification and must therefore be evaluated on the basis of 
justification alone (àlàyé, papò, etc.) cannot become mò and consequently its òótó 
[truth] must remain indeterminate” (Hallen, Sodipo 1997, p. 81).
The second point concerns different epistemologies within the philosophi-
cal tradition. Levisohn and Phillips distinguish between foundationalist (e.g., 
rationalist, empiricist, and positivist) and non-foundationalist (e.g., pragmatist) 
epistemologies. Here, too, the inquiry is normative. As the authors inform us, all 
these coexist because philosophers still disagree about them, even though they are 
in agreement that only one position can be right. This is not the case with appeals 
to  ‘diverse epistemologies’ – which (as their defenders contend) are all equally 
respectable and valid.
The third general use of ‘epistemology’ serves an essentially descriptive func-
tion – and belongs less in philosophy than in the so-called ‘sociology of knowledge’ 
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(which might be called, more fittingly, the ‘sociology of belief ’) and perhaps in 
the psychology of learning. The fourth sense of ‘epistemology’ is also descriptive, 
in that it is “sometimes extended to […] encompass description of the specific 
content of beliefs that are held, or are accorded the status of being knowledge, by 
ethnic or cultural groups […]. In this […] usage, then, multicultural epistemologies 
are simply those differing sets of beliefs held by different communities” (Levisohn, 
Phillips 2012, p. 54).
The authors point out, plausibly I think, that within the descriptive senses, 
the notion of diverse epistemologies is unproblematic – given the interpretation 
of ‘epistemologies’ as ‘beliefs’ or ‘belief systems’. There is, however, no coherent 
normative sense in which the existence of diverse epistemologies (multicultural 
or otherwise) can be affirmed. (This is also the argumentational thread that runs 
through Phillips 2012, where he provides a critical review of several representative 
accounts of epistemological diversity that actually constitute misuses of the term 
‘epistemology’).
What is ‘epistemological diversity’?
Harvey Siegel examines a number of senses in which ‘epistemological diversity’ 
is often used:
– beliefs and belief systems,
– methodological diversity; diversity in research method(ology),
– diversity of research questions,
– diversity of researchers and their cultures, and
– epistemologies and epistemological perspectives.
Although the use of ‘epistemology’ in the first four of these examples is arguably 
inappropriate (in that philosophers do not understand ‘epistemology’ in any of these 
ways), the use of ‘diversity’ is uncontroversial. Beliefs and belief systems vary, as do 
research questions and research methods (although Siegel is quick to point out that 
this should not be taken to imply some kind of methodological relativism, as advo-
cated – for example – by Dani Nabudere3). Similarly, there is considerable variation 
in researchers’ backgrounds, their individual, ethnic and cultural identities, their 
interests, objectives and priorities. The ‘diversity’ in question becomes more contro-
versial, and indeed problematic, in relation to ‘epistemologies and epistemological 
perspectives’. This, says Siegel, goes to the “heart of the matter” (Siegel 2012, p. 73).
 3 Nabudere asserts that the “establishment of the Pan-African University should have as its overall 
goal the provision of opportunities for higher and advanced education for students and adult 
learners in the context of a new African-based epistemology and methodology” (Nabudere 
2003, p. 1; see also pp. 8ff. and 23). The point Siegel wishes to make, I think, is that compelling 
judgements can be made about the quality of competing research methodologies. Some are 
better than others, and some are plainly invalid.
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According to Pallas and others, critical evaluation of these different episte-
mological perspectives is impossible, and – if it were possible – undesirable or 
inappropriate. The question is why this should be so. Siegel examines this from 
a variety of angles.
Is it epistemologically suspect to criticize the epistemology of a particular com-
munity of practice, approach to research, or subordinated group? (Ibid., p. 75) 
This is not obviously the case. According to Siegel, epistemologies “that deserve 
to count as legitimate epistemological alternatives must prove their mettle in the 
give-and-take of scholarly disputation. Some will survive such disputation, others 
will not” (ibid.). Furthermore, it is doubtful whether epistemologies can be at-
tributed to such communities or groups in a straight-forward one-to-one fashion, 
given the considerable variation within these communities, groups and subgroups. 
Siegel perceives a “problematic essentialism” in any such mapping (ibid., p. 78).
Is it morally suspect to criticize the epistemology of a particular community 
of practice, approach to research, or subordinated group? (Ibid.) Even if we could 
attribute epistemologies to different communities, groups and subgroups, Siegel 
does not consider criticism to be morally problematic: treating members’ ideas with 
respect means taking them seriously, by subjecting them to due critical considera-
tion and interrogation, rather than ignoring them. Moreover, if disputation and 
evaluation follow relevant moral principles, if they are fair-minded, non-question-
begging, neutral (in the sense not of ‘global’ but of ‘local neutrality’) and rational, 
then it is difficult to see how such criticism could be morally suspect.
Is it inevitably an abuse of power to criticize? (Ibid., p. 79) In other words, are 
these moral principles or criteria not themselves the creation and stipulation of the 
dominant social group? According to Siegel, hegemonic abuse of power is rejected 
on the basis of critical evaluation and compelling argument. It is not clear how any 
rejection of hegemonic imposition, any critique of dominant social power (for an 
example of such rejection and critique, see Code 2012, p. 93), can be coherent and 
consistent without advocates of alternative epistemologies employing these “tools 
of mainstream philosophical thought” (Siegel 2012, p. 80). 
Is it pragmatically suspect to criticize the epistemology of a particular community 
of practice, or approach to research, or subordinated group? (Ibid., p. 81) Should 
education researchers, to the greatest extent possible, not be able to interact with 
all available research – mainstream and alternative alike? Siegel considers such 
all-inclusive engagement worth rejecting for ‘equally pragmatic’ reasons – lack of 
truth-content, lack of relevance, time constraints, and the like.
The call for epistemological diversity becomes problematic when it conflates 
epistemological pluralism and epistemological relativism, “which can only hamper 
the important project of rethinking the graduate education of future education 
researchers” (ibid., p. 83). For example, while Wajcman (2004) does recognize the 
dimension of epistemological relativism, she does not problematize it. Instead, she 
pleads both for epistemological diversity and for allowing several truths to exist 
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alongside each other. The following section examines the problem of relativism in 
the light of feminist critiques of epistemology, and feminist standpoint epistemol-
ogy in particular.
Feminist critiques of epistemology, and the problem of relativism
“The starting point of standpoint theory”, writes Sandra Harding, “is that in so-
cieties stratified by race, ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, or some other such 
politics shaping the very structure of a society, the activities of those at the top 
both organize and set limits on what persons who perform such activities can 
understand about themselves and the world around them” (Harding 2002, p. 357). 
She asserts that “the standpoint claims that all knowledge attempts are socially 
situated and […] some of these objective social locations are better than others as 
starting points for knowledge projects challenge some of the most fundamental 
assumptions of the scientific world view and the Western thought that takes science 
as its model of how to produce knowledge” (ibid., p. 359). Standpoint theorists 
argue that thought, for example educational research, should start off “from the 
lives of marginalized peoples; beginning in those determinate, objective locations 
in any social order will generate illuminating critical questions that do not arise in 
thought that begins from dominant group lives”. The idea is starting off research 
from the lives of women “will generate less partial and distorted accounts not only 
of women’s’ lives but also of men’s lives and of the whole social order”. The lives 
and experiences of women “provide the ‘grounds’ for this knowledge, though these 
clearly do not provide foundations for knowledge in the conventional philosophical 
sense” (ibid., pp. 359-360).
Harding does not illustrate or provide further argument for her claim that 
starting off research from women’s lives “will generate less partial and distorted 
accounts […] also of men’s lives and of the whole social order”. In a related move, 
she maintains that “standpoint theory does not advocate – nor is it doomed to – 
relativism”. It takes issue with “the idea that all social situations provide equally 
useful resources for learning about the world and against the idea that they all 
set equally strong limits on knowledge”. In opposition to universalist thinking, 
“standpoint theory is not committed to such a claim as a consequence of rejecting 
universalism”. It “provides arguments for the claim that some social situations are 
scientifically better than others as places from which to start off knowledge pro-
jects, and those arguments must be defeated if the charge of relativism is to gain 
plausibility” (ibid., 364). Harding goes on to distinguish between judgmental (or 
epistemological) relativism and sociological relativism. The former “is anathema 
to any scientific project, and feminist ones are no exception”, whereas the latter 
“permits us to acknowledge that different people hold different beliefs”. According 
to Harding, what is “at issue in rethinking objectivity is the different matter of 
judgmental or epistemological relativism”. She maintains that standpoint theories 
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are “neither hold nor are doomed” to judgemental or epistemological relativism 
(ibid., pp. 364-365). Harding claims that both “moral and cognitive forms of judg-
mental relativism have determinate histories; they appear as intellectual problems 
at certain times in history in only some cultures and only for certain groups of 
people”. However, she does not consider relativism to be “fundamentally a problem 
that emerges from feminist or any other thought that starts in marginalized lives; 
it is one that emerges from the thought of the dominant groups” (ibid., p. 365).
It may be correct that this problem does not emerge from feminist and other 
thought, but this does not mean that it does not present a challenge to these. Harding 
continues: “Judgmental relativism is sometimes the most that dominant groups 
can stand to grant their critics – ‘OK, your claims are valid for you, but mine are 
valid for me’” (ibid., p. 365). In a footnote (ibid., p. 382 n. 39), she approvingly refers 
to Mary G. Belenky and her colleagues (Belenky et al. 1986), who have pointed out 
that the phrase ‘It’s my opinion…’ has different meanings for the young men and 
women they have studied. For men this phrase means ‘I’ve got a right to my opin-
ion’, but for women it means ‘It’s just my opinion’. Even if this study is accepted 
as providing ‘evidence’4, it is hardly enough to make any sweeping global claims 
about the social situatedness of knowledge and truth. As Levisohn and Phillips 
have pointed out, “Even for a self-proclaimed standpointist like Harding, the most 
we can say is that while different cultural standpoints play a significant role in 
the construction of knowledge, fundamentally we all play by the same normative 
epistemic rules” (Levisohn, Phillips 2012, p. 61).
Lorraine Code asserts that “Feminist critiques of epistemology, of the philosophy 
of science, and of social science have demonstrated that the ideals of the autono-
mous reasoner – the dislocated disinterested observer – and the epistemologies they 
inform are artifacts of a small, privileged group of educated, usually prosperous 
white men” (2012, p. 91). This is not at all obvious, one might respond. First, there 
is no such homogeneous group, nor has there ever been one; second, one of the few 
matters (if not the only matter!) epistemologists have reached agreement about is 
the basic distinction between knowledge and belief, where the former (propositional 
knowledge or ‘knowledge-that’) is anchored by the objective component of, i.e. the 
truth condition. Could feminists coherently and consistently reject this distinction?
Code presents the case against “traditional ‘S-knows-that-p’ epistemologies, 
with their ideals of pure objectivity and value-neutrality” (ibid., pp. 85, 86), on the 
grounds that epistemology would look quite different if it took as its starting focus 
cases of ‘knowledge by acquaintance’, where the subjectivity and positionality 
 4 There are substantial reasons for doubting this. It has been pointed out by Susan Haack (1998, p. 
125) that the authors informed their subjects prior to the interviews that they would be partici-
pating in a study dedicated to finding out more about their unique ‘women’s ways of knowing’. 
This makes it virtually impossible to know whether the responses given were not biased by the 
authors’ suggestion.
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of the knower might turn out to be epistemically relevant. But are subjectivity 
and positionality really relevant in most epistemologically important inquiries? 
Without wishing to belittle the sometime significance of ‘knowing a person’ etc., 
I suspect not. 
According to Code, “A realistic commitment to achieving empirical advocacy 
that engages situated analyses of the subjectivities of both the knower and (where 
appropriate) the known is both desirable and possible” (ibid., p. 97). Code’s own case 
study, John Philippe Rushton’s empirical investigation into the purported superior-
ity of Orientals over whites, and of whites over blacks, arguably fails to illustrate 
what she intends (see Rushton 2000). Contrary to what she asserts, ‘Rushton knows 
that blacks are inferior’ does not invalidate the ‘S-knows-that-p’ formula. ‘Rushton 
claims to know that blacks are inferior’ would be a more appropriate rendition5. 
It is a knowledge claim that is fairly swiftly disposed with, on the grounds of ad-
equacy of evidence (or lack thereof), as well as arbitrary construction of a scale of 
superiority/inferiority.
The argument from epistemic injustice
Malegapuru Makgoba’s account of “the changing and competitive world of kno-
wledge, values and norms’ and his view that ‘knowledge, values and ideals’ are 
always, and necessarily, those of a particular society” (2003, p. 1) betray a compre-
hensive relativism, epistemological, cultural and moral. As they stand, they are 
logically questionable and epistemically inconsistent. Most significantly, Makgoba’s 
assertions about the ‘changing’ world of knowledge and knowledge being societally 
relative are presented as knowledge-claims and – as such – presumably as unchan-
ging and as universal, or at least as transsocietal. Similarly, when Annette Lansink 
argues, following Harding, that “it should be acknowledged that all knowledge is 
culturally local” (2004, p. 133), the obvious rejoinder is: What about this particular 
piece of knowledge, then? Is it also ‘culturally local’? If so, why should anyone who 
is not a member of Lansink’s ‘culture’ be impressed by this claim? If it is not, i.e. 
if this is indeed a translocal knowledge claim, then why should there not be other 
knowledge that transcends culture and locality? Moreover, if values and norms are 
essentially subject to change as well as relative to particular societies and cultures, 
then one could not consistently condemn human rights abuses, racist and sexist 
attitudes, let alone unjust legislation, in societies other than one’s own. On the other 
 5 Either way, it would appear that this is an incorrect attribution. When Rushton was asked dur-
ing a live televised debate at the University of Western Ontario in 1989 whether he believed in 
racial superiority, he denied this emphatically. He added, “from an evolutionary point of view, 
superiority can only mean adaptive value – if it even means this. And we’ve got to realize that 
each of these populations is perfectly, beautifully adapted to their own ancestral environments” 
(Knudtson 1991, p. 187).
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hand, the moral injunction to respect other cultures’ values and norms is clearly 
transcultural and unchanging, and therefore contradicts Makgoba’s account. And 
if democracy and justice transcend culture, as is (correctly) implied by De Sousa 
Santos et al (2008, p. xx), then why should propositional knowledge not transcend 
social and cultural practices?
But does the account of knowledge and epistemology I endorse here not amount 
to a denial of epistemic justice? Take, as a further possible example, Siegel’s no-
holds-barred response to Claudia Ruitenberg’s question regarding “indigenous 
African women’s epistemologies” (during a roundtable discussion held in San 
Francisco in April 2010; see Code et al. 2012, p. 137): “They’re not epistemologies. 
If students don’t understand that by the end of their graduate education, they 
haven’t been well educated” (ibid., p. 138). Could this possibly constitute some kind 
of epistemic harm vis-à-vis indigenous African women?
“Epistemic injustice”, argues Miranda Fricker, is a distinct kind of injustice. 
She distinguishes between two kinds, ‘testimonial injustice’ and ‘hermeneutical 
injustice’, each of which consists, “most fundamentally, in a wrong done to some-
one specifically in their capacity as a knower” (2007, p. 1; see also p. 21). Central 
to her analysis is the notion of (social) ‘power’, which Fricker defines as “a socially 
situated capacity to control others’ actions” (ibid., p. 4). Power works “to create or 
preserve a given social order”, and is displayed in various forms of enablement, 
on the one hand, and disbelief, misinterpretation and silencing, on the other. It 
involves the conferral on certain individuals or groups, qua persons of that kind, 
‘a credibility excess’ or ‘a credibility deficit’ (ibid., p. 21). Fricker’s interest resides 
specifically with ‘identity power’ and the harms it produces through the mani-
festation of ‘identity prejudices’. The latter are responsible for denying credibility 
to, or withholding it from, certain persons on the basis of their being members of 
a certain “social type” (ibid.). Thus, testimonial injustice involves rejecting the cred-
ibility of their knowledge claims, while hermeneutical injustice involves a general 
failure of marshalling the conceptual resources necessary for understanding and 
interpreting these knowledge claims. The result is that these people are hindered 
in their self-development and in their attainment of full human worth: they are 
“prevented from becoming who they are” (ibid., p. 5). In white patriarchal societies, 
these “epistemic humiliations” (ibid., p. 51) carry the power to destroy a would-be 
(black or female) knower’s confidence to engage in the trustful conversations (ibid., 
p. 52-53) that characterise well-functioning epistemic communities. As Fricker sug-
gests, they can “inhibit the very formation of self” (ibid., p. 55). Although they are 
experienced (and may be performed) individually, testimonial and hermeneutical 
injustice constitute not only individual harms: they originate within a social fabric 
of which the biases and prejudices that enliven and perpetuate them are a charac-
teristic part. Contesting such injustices and harms, according to Fricker, requires 
“collective social political change” (ibid., p. 8).
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Considering how prejudice affects various levels of credibility, and also con-
sidering that scepticism about ‘diverse epistemologies’ has sometimes been part 
of a hegemonic discourse and constituted epistemic injustice, the question might 
now be raised whether my critique of this notion (and its affiliates, like ‘indigenous 
knowledge’ or ‘local ways of knowing’) is not part of this discourse. I do not think 
it is. If ‘credibility deficit’ is a matter of epistemic injustice, then why should ‘cred-
ibility excess’ (giving previously ‘epistemologically humiliated’ people or groups 
excessive credibility) not also constitute epistemic harm? More fundamentally, 
and this point pertains to Siegel’s response to Ruitenberg (concerning “indigenous 
African women’s epistemologies”), surely there is a difference between criticizing 
someone’s view on the mere grounds that she is black, or a woman, and criticizing 
the views held or expressed by someone, who happens to be black or a woman, on 
the grounds of faulty or fallacious reasoning. Nonsense is not culturally, racially 
or sexually specific. Indeed, although she gestures in the direction of a basic ‘do no 
harm’ principle (Siegel 2012, p. 85), Fricker herself insists that a “vulgar relativist” 
resistance to passing moral judgment on other cultures “is incoherent” (Fricker 
2007, p. 106).
The value of diversity for knowledge
More recently, Emily Robertson has argued that diversity is both an epistemic 
and a moral virtue, but that this argument “does not support alternative episte-
mologies, cognitive relativism, or the replacement of truth as an epistemic goal by, 
for example, beliefs that have progressive consequences” (2013, p. 300). The value 
of diversity for knowledge resides in the possibility of different groups having 
‘different experiences that lead them to know or believe things that escape others’ 
attention’: reports of their experiences may function as data that allows researchers 
to examine the social system or structure from their social location (ibid., p. 304). 
While postcolonial theory arguably errs in postulating the existence of diverse 
knowledges and truths, the diversity in question is conceivably generated by (char-
acteristically) practical epistemic priorities – priorities that emanate from different 
lived experiences, individual as well as social and cultural. A plausible view appears 
to be that knowledge and truth do not fluctuate, that they remain invariant across 
individuals, societies and cultures, but that there may well be distinctive sets of 
epistemic concerns that arise from particular personal, historical and socio-political 
circumstances. If it is correct to assume that practical epistemic and educational 
priorities will emerge from life experiences and from the ways these are socially 
articulated, then one might assume that, given that the different life experiences 
of people across the globe, the practical epistemic and educational priorities will 
also differ.
For example, as Elizabeth Anderson has put it (2002, p. 325), “No one disputes 
that personal knowledge of what it is like to be pregnant, undergo childbirth, 
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suffer menstrual cramps, and have other experiences of a female body is specific 
to women”. Gynecology has made substantial progress “since women entered the 
field and have brought their personal knowledge to bear on misogynist medical 
practices”. According to Anderson, the “claims get more controversial the more 
global they are in scope”. Some writers “claim that women have gender-typical 
‘ways of knowing’, styles of thinking, methodologies, and ontologies that globally 
govern or characterize their cognitive activities across all subject matters”. For 
example, “various feminist epistemologists have claimed that women think more 
intuitively and contextually, concern themselves more with particulars than with 
abstractions, emotionally engage themselves more with individual subjects of 
study, and frame their thoughts in relational rather than an atomistic ontology”. 
Anderson contends, quite plausibly, that there is “little persuasive evidence for such 
global claims” (ibid.). Interestingly, too, she does not “suppose that women theorists 
bring some shared feminine difference to all subjects of knowledge” (ibid., p. 326).
Given, to use a further example, the experience of ‘indigenous’ Africans of 
a wide-ranging credibility deficit, it stands to reason that they would have as priori-
ties matters of epistemic transformation and redress. If epistemic and educational 
concerns and priorities arise from different forms of social life, then those that 
have emerged from a social system in which a particular race or group has been 
subordinate to another deserve special scrutiny. Given the (especially vicious) 
history of physical and psychological colonization, it is plausible that one of the 
epistemic and educational priorities will be to educate against development of 
a subordinate or inferior mindset, as well as against a victim and beggar mental-
ity, despite the continuing economic crisis and low level of economic growth. An 
additional priority arises with Africa’s low literacy quotients. In many countries, 
the language of conceptualization and education is the official language of ad-
ministration: English, French or Portuguese, in which the majority of children 
and learners are not primarily competent. Consequently, there exist few successes 
in learning; quality and efficiency suffer; and high repeat and dropout rates mean 
a squandering of available resources. While it does not follow that particular his-
torical and socio-economic circumstances yield or bestow automatic validation or 
justification of (the content and objectives of) an ‘African epistemology’, an idea 
like ‘decolonization of the African mind’ has a particular resonance here. Rather 
than implying a ‘post-truth’ epistemology, it involves ‘going back to one’s language’ 
in ‘thinking about thinking’, examining one’s ‘own ways of conceptualization’ – in 
short, ‘philosophizing’ (Wiredu 2008).
If what has been established above is cogent, it follows that so-called ‘epistemo-
logical diversity’ refers neither to a multitude of truths nor to an ‘anything goes’ 
conception of justification, but rather to different experiences connected to par-
ticular social locations, or – as Robertson puts it – to different social pathways 
to knowledge (note the singular!). In this sense, reference to ‘epistemologies’ – like 
reference to “plural systems of knowledges” (De Sousa Santos et al. 2008, p. xxxix) 
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or to indigenous, local or subaltern ways of knowing – is not only unhelpful but 
also misleading.
*  *  *
The promise of an educationally relevant epistemology, an epistemology for the 
real world, then, has in part to do with context and locality – but not in terms of 
any exclusionist, ‘hands-off ’ approach. Rather, it appears to be plausible that the 
particular historical, geographic and socio-cultural experiences of people give rise 
to particular priorities that shape their epistemic theory and educational practice 
– and also yield conceptual tools that are likely to enrich epistemology as a whole.
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„ZRÓŻNICOWANIE EPISTEMOLOGICZNE” W EDUKACJI. 
ROZWAŻANIA FILOZOFICZNE I DYDAKTYCZNE
Streszczenie: Niedawno powstałe, ale już szeroko rozpowszechnione przekonanie utrzy-
muje, że grupy etniczne i kulturowe mają swoje własne, wyróżniające je epistemologie i że 
epistemologie także mają płeć, a fakt ten był dotąd przeważnie ignorowany przez dominującą 
grupę społeczną. Konsekwencją tego przekonania jest pogląd, że badania nad edukacją są 
prowadzone w ramach obejmujących pewne założenia na temat wiedzy i jej uzyskiwania, 
nakreślonych przez dominującą grupę i odzwierciedlających jej interesy i historyczne trady-
cje. Nawoływanie do epistemologicznego zróżnicowania staje się problematyczne, gdy łączy 
w sobie epistemologiczny pluralizm i relatywizm. Bardzo często argumentacja za innymi, 
zróżnicowanymi, alternatywnymi, zdekolonializowanymi czy zdemaskulinizowanymi 
epistemologiami nadal nie rozwiązuje, a czasem wręcz całkowicie pomija istotne kwestie 
filozoficzne. Co dokładnie oznaczają twierdzenia dotyczące epistemologicznego zróżni-
cowania? Czy te sposoby ustanawiania wiedzy są w stanie przetrwać próbę krytycznego 
badania? Ponadto, jaki jest ich związek z tradycyjnymi rozróżnieniami epistemologicznymi, 
np. między wiedzą a wiarą i między dociekaniami deskryptywnymi a normatywnymi 
oraz takimi podstawowymi komponentami epistemologicznymi, jak dowód/uzasadnienie 
i prawda? Niniejszy artykuł analizuje niektóre błędy i mylne pojęcia, które można odnaleźć 
w nawoływaniu do rozwijania zróżnicowanych epistemologii. Stawiane tu pytanie nie ma 
na celu jedynie ustalenia, czy słowo „epistemologia” jest lub nie jest poprawnie używane, 
ale także (co jest znacznie ważniejsze), czy zagadnienia, którymi się zajmuje ta dziedzina 
filozofii, nie są traktowane pobieżnie lub wręcz całkowicie pomijane.
Słowa kluczowe: badania nad edukacją, zróżnicowanie epistemologiczne, pluralizm, 
relatywizm.
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